Introduction
Household saving behavior is an important concern for policy makers because higher saving rates entail higher income growth (Beck, Levine & Loayza, 2000; Loayza, SchmidtHebbel & Servén, 2000; Levine, 2005) , mitigate economic shocks for individuals (Browning & Lusardi, 1996) and contribute to maintaining living standards over retirement (Benartzi & Thaler, 2013) . The choice of formal saving instruments is also of high policy concern because it can have a direct effect on income and wealth inequality (Panizza, 2015) and investment in human capital (Karlan, Ratan & Zinman, 2014) . Nonetheless, household choice of saving instruments is not thoroughly investigated in the extant literature, particularly in developing countries.
The lack of national savings and strained state pension schemes have called for reform in many Central, Eastern and Southeastern European countries (The World Bank, 2014) .
These countries -like many -are characterized by ageing of society which drives up costs in the pension and healthcare systems, ultimately putting a strain on public finances and an emphasis on individuals' saving behavior. Furthermore, the region is also characterized by high informal savings (Beckmann, 2016; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015) . The domestic accumulation of financial resources through the formal financial sector is fundamental for economic development (Beck, Levine & Loayza, 2000) because for instance it allows to exploit more and larger investment opportunities and it fosters the growth of private sector firms (Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2010) . In this context, recent studies have highlighted how in Central, Eastern and Southeastern European countries, the lack of trust has favored cash preferences over formal savings (Stix, 2013; Brown & Stix, 2015) . It follows that it is paramount for policy makers in this region to understand whether trust is a significant variable in the choice of saving instrument.
Is trust a significant determinant of household saving behavior? Does trust in different financial institutions matter for the composition of household savings? We answer these questions using unique household survey data for a sample of ten Central, Eastern and Southeastern European emerging market economies. We find that trust in different financial institutions is positively and significantly related to the likelihood to save formally. In line with this result, higher levels of trust imply a lower likelihood to hold informal savings. Trust in banks increases the probability of formal savings, particularly bank savings. However, trust in deposit safety has a stronger and differential impact than trust in banks on the probability to hold savings at banks. We find that households who distrust banks not only resort to informal savings but also to formal non-bank savings if they trust the stability of the financial system.
The determinants of households' saving behavior have been widely investigated in the economics literature, which shows that a large number of factors may affect households' saving behavior. Our selected sample of emerging market economies allows us to bridge two themes of this research. Specifically, on the one hand previous research has shown that trust is an important determinant of participation in the stock market and risky financial assets in advanced economies; on the other hand, it has shown that lack of trust in banks is an important determinant of informal savings in transition economies and developing countries.
Empirical evidence on households' participation in capital markets is limited to advanced economies (Panizza, 2015) and shows that actual participation in capital markets is very low, especially in Europe (Arrondel et al., 2014) . This lack of participation has inter alia been explained by trust in financial markets. The seminal paper by Guiso et al. (2008) investigates the role of general trust and shows that less trusting individuals are less likely to buy stocks. Similarly, El-Attar and Poschke (2011) advocate that lack of trust reduces investment particularly in risky assets. By the same token, Balloch et al. (2015) suggest that stock market literacy and trust affect the probability of participation in the stock market and the share of investment in stocks. Delis and Mylonidis (2015) confirm the importance of trust and argue that happiness is another key driver of the decision to participate in stock markets.
On the other hand, trust -or rather the lack of it -has been highlighted as one of the key determinants for non-participation in formal savings. Stix (2013) concludes that lack of trust and previous experience of banking crises explain the continuously high preference for saving in cash in transition European economies. Recent studies suggest that trust should be differentiated by type of financial institution. Jin et al. (2016) show that the proportion and likelihood of foreign ownership in listed firms in China increases with the level of social trust.
Filipiak (2016) analyses savings patterns in India and conclude that geographic proximity is highly relevant for trusting different types of financial institutions.
We contribute to the extant literature on household saving behavior by presenting evidence on household choice of saving instruments in ten emerging market economies. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only data set which simultaneously includes evidence on informal savings, bank, contractual and capital market savings. The novel feature of our study is to differentiate trust by type of institution, specifically disentangling trust in banks, in the safety of deposits and in the financial system. Thus we are able to link two strands of the literature -the importance of trust for capital market investment and the importance of trust for the choice of formal versus informal savings -pinning down the effect of trust on households' choice among different saving instruments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the data and variables (section 2), and the empirical design (section 3). Next, we present our results (section 4) and robustness checks (section 5). Conclusions are summarized in section 6.
Data and variables
In this section, we outline our data (section 2.1), how we measure households' saving behavior (section 2.2) and trust (section 2.3), and describe other relevant determinants of household savings (section 2.4).
Data: OeNB Euro Survey
The main data source for the analysis is the "OeNB Euro Survey" conducted by the We employ data from 2 surveys conducted in fall 2012 and 2013, as these two waves include all of our main variables of interest as well as a full comprehensive set of necessary control variables. Thus, our analysis focuses on 10 countries and around 20,000 individuals.
Measuring household saving behavior
We measure household savings behavior looking at the percentage of households that hold a diverse set of financial saving instruments conditional on having any savings. whether the respondent holds more than one of the above-mentioned saving instruments excluding cash. We consider cash as an indicator of informal savings as the amounts are saved outside the formal financial system. < Insert Figure 1 about here > Figure 1 shows the saving instruments held by respondents who currently have any savings. It suggests that the choice of formal versus informal saving instruments is negatively correlated and that bank savings and contractual savings are highly correlated. Table 2 provides additional evidence on this descriptive results. 
< Insert

Measuring trust
Trust has been defined as the confidence that money is safely invested. This encompasses two aspects. Firstly, the security that money will not be stolen. This is a concern even for those investors that operate in an environment where investor protection exists and law enforcement is high (see for instance Filipiak, 2016 and Gennaioli, Shleifer & Vishny, 2015) . Secondly, trust may vary depending on not only personal characteristics, but also on type of financial institution (Guiso et al., 2008; Stix, 2013) . Therefore, we employ four indicators to capture the different level of trust in different financial institutions: trust in the safety of deposits, trust in domestically owned banks, trust in foreign owned banks and trust in the stability of the financial system in general. Figure 2 shows the percentage of respondents and their trust in the different financial institutions. Trust in the stability of the financial system is highest, followed by trust in deposit safety. In all countries, except Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia, trust in domestically owned banks is higher than trust in foreign owned banks.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the determinants of trust itself, we shed some light on the interdependence of the different measures of trust to motivate their separate inclusion in the analysis (Table 3) . First, looking at the multiple correlation coefficients, we notice that the measures are linearly interdependent, especially trust in domestically owned banks. Nonetheless, the non-parametric ANOVA statistic denotes that the measures convey different information as samples are not stochastically dominated. The results from the pairwise correlation analysis show that our measures of trust fall into two groups. Trust in domestic and foreign banks are strongly and positively correlated. The correlation between trust in the stability of the financial system and trust in deposit safety is the second "strongest" and stronger than the correlation between trust in banks and trust in deposit safety as well as trust in financial stability and trust in deposit safety. Table 3 about here >
< Insert
Other control variables
We control for a rich set of behavioral and demographic characteristics as well as indicators of transaction costs. All our estimations include information on sociodemographics which have been shown to influence the choice of saving instruments: age, gender, size of household, whether there are any children in the household, marital status and whether the respondent is in charge of managing household finances (Sunden & Surette, 1998; Love, 2010; Halko, Kaustia, & Alanko, 2012; Beckmann, Hake, & Urvova, 2013) .
Following Palia et al. (2014) we further control for factors affecting background riskthe labor market status, ownership of housing and private business. We also account for education and, in robustness analyses, for financial literacy (van Rooij, Lusardi & Alessie, 2011; Balloch, Nicolaei & Philip, 2015) . In addition, taking into account the findings by Guiso et al. (1996) , our estimations include information whether the respondent has a loan or plans to take out a loan. Karlan et al. (2014) highlight that inter alia transaction costs may hinder the adoption of formal saving products. Following Brown et al. (2015), we proxy for transaction costs by including geographic proximity to the nearest banks (see Beckmann, Reiter & Stix, 2016 for a detailed account on how these data are compiled). We further include information on light intensity at night which is a useful proxy for local economic activity (Henderson, Storeygard & Weil, 2012) .
Finally, following the recent paper by Balloch et al. (2015) we control for a wide range of behavioral characteristics including risk aversion, expectations and trust in other nonfinancial institutions which allows us to isolate the effect of trust in financial institutions.
Different country-specific institutional settings and cultural characteristics may exert a significant impact on the prominence and relevance of different savings motives (Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, & Servén, 2000; Grigoli, Herman, & Schmidt-Hebbel, 2014) . Interacted country-survey fixed effects control for country-specific characteristics such as differences in deposit insurance schemes (Prean & Stix, 2011) and the presence of public pension schemes which may lower private saving rates (Le Blanc et al., 2015) .
The complete list of variables along with their definition and descriptive statistics appear in Table 4 . 
where households and countries are indexed by h and c, respectively; S is a variable associated to households' saving behavior, namely formal savings, savings in cash only, banks savings, contractual savings, capital market savings, and more than 1 formal saving instrument; TRUST is a variable related to trust in institutions, specifically in the stability of the financial system, in deposits safety, in domestic banks, in foreign banks and in central banks; X are the set of household characteristics; αcw are interacted country and survey wave fixed effects; ε are robust standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit and time level.
Given that a large fraction of households do not save, our regression might suffer from selection bias (Palia, Qi, & Wu, 2014 We check for the robustness of our results by estimating a Heckman selection model.
Following Allen et al. (2012) , we jointly estimate the probability of having savings and the probability of holding specific asset categories. Selection equation (2) accounts for the incidence of having any savings:
whereas the outcome equation (3) measures the choice of saving instrument, conditional on having any savings:
It is assumed that the error terms are normally distributed,
with correlation ( , ) = .
As our sample of countries is diverse, we further check for the robustness of our results by dropping one country at a time from the analysis. We also allow the effect of unobserved dependencies to vary by repeating the estimations with standard errors clustered at the regional and country level.
Results
Conditional on having any savings, we relate trust and other determinants to indicators of different saving instruments. For each outcome variable, we report separately the results of the regressions where we include each measure of trust one at a time along with a full set of control variables.
< Insert Table 5 about here > How does trust in different financial institutions affect the probability to hold certain saving instruments? Table 5 reports the results for the relevant trust variables only. 3 Trust in the stability of the financial system is positively related to the likelihood to hold formal savings and negatively related to informal savings (cash). The average marginal effect is stronger for holding more than one formal saving instrument (6.4 percentage points) and bank savings (4.4 percentage points). Trusting the financial system also increases the likelihood of holding contractual savings and capital market savings. Furthermore, households are less likely to hold cash if they trust the financial system (decrease of 3.2 percentage points).
Compared to trust in financial stability, trust in deposits safety has a stronger effect on the likelihood to hold savings with banks. The average marginal effect is higher than in the previous case (5.6 percentage points versus 4.4 percentage points) and the highest compared to the average marginal effects associated to the other saving products. Households are 4.0 percentage points more likely to hold formal savings and 3.4 percentage points less likely to save in cash. We notice a decrease in the marginal effect associated with holding more than one formal saving instrument to 2.4 percentage points. Furthermore, the marginal effects for contractual savings and capital savings are not statistically significant. It follows that trust in deposits safety appears to be more related to the likelihood that households save at banks and save formally instead of incentivizing households to diversify across saving products.
Marginal effects of trust in domestic banks on the different set of savings products confirm the same pattern noticed for trust in deposit safety. In this case the magnitude of the effects is lower except for the likelihood of holding formal savings that is now 4.3 percentage points. Interestingly, when we analyze trust in foreign banks, there is a significant impact on contractual savings (3.7 percentage points) and capital savings (1.8 percentage points).
Moreover, both measures of trust contribute to decreasing the likelihood of holding informal savings (minus 3.2 and 3.6 percentage points for trust in domestic banks and trust in foreign banks, respectively).
Setting the marginal effects into perspective with the sample probability of the respective dependent variable, shows that all the estimated effects are also economically significant.
We do not discuss results on the remaining control variables in detail but note that these are in line with previous research (Table A1) (2013) and Brown and Stix (2015), we show that the experience of previous economic crises significantly affects the choice of saving instruments.
< Insert Table 6 about here > To assure that these results are not driven by sample selection, we repeat these estimations using a Heckman selection probit model. Results, displayed in Table 6 , confirm our previous findings and show even stronger effects of trust on holding cash, formal savings and bank savings. The selection bias turns out to be significant for contractual savings. This is likely related to the fact that life insurance in some countries is a prerequisite for taking out a loan and thus the distinction between "savers" holding life insurance and borrowers holding life insurance is important. However, with the exception of contractual savings and holding more than one saving instrument, the selection bias is not statistically significant at the 10% level.
< Insert Table 7 about here > Hitherto, we have focused only on how trust affects participation in each saving instrument separately. The interaction between trusts in different financial institutions may have a significant impact on the choice of saving instruments. In Table 7 we look at the saving behavior of respondents who state they do not trust banks (neither domestic nor foreign). For these respondents we find that if they trust in the stability of the financial system they are still significantly less likely to save in cash, significantly more likely to have formal savings and also bank savings. Interestingly, we also find respondents who distrust banks are significantly more likely to invest in contractual savings; and there is also a positive and significant impact on the likelihood of holding a diversified formal savings portfolio. This result suggests a substitution effect between formal saving products and shows that lack of trust in banks does not automatically lead to informal savings even in countries with a fairly recent history of economic turbulence and banking crises during transition. The results for trust in deposit safety indicate a significant role for government policies, especially for deposit insurance when trust in banks is low. Respondents who distrust banks are still 3.9
percentage points more likely to save formally and 5.5 percentage points more likely to save at banks if they trust the safety of deposits.
< Insert Table 8 about here >
In a final step, we exploit the fact that respondents rank the various saving instruments according to the amount invested and investigate how trust affects the allocation of savings across saving products. Table 8 reports the results where the trust variables explain whether a specific saving instrument receives the highest allocation of savings. Our previous findings hold and are even stronger if we focus on those cases where cash / bank savings constitute the most important saving instrument. For contractual and capital market savings the effect of trust turns statistically insignificant.
Robustness tests
Several robustness tests were conducted. In their recent paper, Balloch et al. (2015) find that trust and financial literacy are two distinct but simultaneous channels explaining participation in the stock market. While our data does not include indicators of financial literacy related to participation in specific savings instruments, we can nevertheless control for general indicators of financial literacy following Lusardi and Mitchell (2014). We do not include these in the baseline estimations because of the potential endogeneity with the choice of saving instruments. Table 9 shows that results for our trust variables are qualitatively the same after controlling for financial literacy. As expected, financial literacy is positively and significantly correlated with the probability of holding formal or bank savings.
< Insert Table 9 about here >
We use a number of alternative specifications to test the robustness of our results. 4 The choice of saving instruments for households with loans may differ significantly from that of other households therefore we repeat estimations excluding respondent who have a loan.
Furthermore, our sample of countries is fairly diverse hence we check whether the results are driven by a particular country by repeating the estimations excluding one country at a time.
We also allow for the effect of unobserved dependencies to vary by repeating estimations with standard errors clustered at the regional and at the country level respectively. Finally, we utilize instrumental variable estimations to address the potential endogeneity of trust.
Specifically, we employ trust in the police as an instrument for trust in financial institutions.
None of these changes in the model specification affect our main results.
Conclusions
In this article we empirically assess whether trust affects households' saving behavior.
Households' saving behavior is defined as the percentage of households that hold a diverse range of saving instruments, such as cash, bank savings, contractual savings and capital market savings. We distinguish between trust in the stability of the financial system, deposit safety, domestic banks and foreign banks.
We conclude that the set of trust measures significantly increases the likelihood that households hold formal saving instruments and decreases informal holdings. bank highest Binary variable derived from survey question presented in Table 1 , takes on value one if respondent has the highest amount of his/her savings in a current account or savings deposit, zero otherwise.
contractual highest
Binary variable derived from survey question presented in Table 1 , takes on value one if respondent has the highest amount of his/her savings invested in life insurance or pension funds, zero otherwise.
capital highest Binary variable derived from survey question presented in Table 1 , takes on value one if respondent has the highest amount of his/her savings invested in stocks, bonds or mutual funds, zero otherwise.
Trust in financial institutions
financial system stable Derived from question "Currently, banks and the financial system are stable in [MY COUNTRY]." Respondents could agree on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree). Dummy variable, answers from 1 to 3 are defined as one.
deposits safe
Derived from question "Currently, depositing money at banks is very safe in [MY COUNTRY]." Respondents could agree on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree). Dummy variable, answers from 1 to 3 are defined as one.
trust domestic banks, trust foreign banks
Based on question "I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. 1 means 'I trust completely', 2 means 'I somewhat trust', 3 means 'I neither trust nor distrust', 4 means 'I somewhat distrust' and 5 means 'I do not trust at all'. (a) domestically owned banks (b) foreign owned banks". Dummy variable coded as one if respondents somewhat or completely trust, zero else. 
receives remittances
Derived from answers to the question "Do you personally or your partner receive any money from abroad? E.g. from family members living or working abroad, pension payments, etc.?" Binary variable coded as one if answer is "yes, regularly" or "yes, infrequently", else zero.
employed, self-employed, retired
Binary variable coded as one if respondent belongs to selected occupational category.
education (secondary, tertiary) Binary variables; degree of education (tertiary level, medium level and primary education). Omitted category: Primary education risk averse
Derived from question "In financial matters, I prefer safe investments over risky investments." Respondents could agree on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree). Dummy variable, answers from 1 to 3 are defined as one. 
plan loan
Binary variable derived from the question "Do you plan to take out a loan within the next year and if so in what currency?" Answer "No" is coded as zero, answers "Yes, in local currency", "Yes, in euro", "Yes, in Swiss franc" and "Yes, in other foreign currency" are coded as one. Answers "Don't know" and "No answer" are coded as missing.
exp econ sit better
Derived from question "Over the next five years, the economic situation of my country will improve." Respondents could agree on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree). Binary variable, answers from 1 to 3 are defined as one.
log(nightlight)
Proxy for local economic activity based on Henderson et al.(2012) . Light intensity at night in a 20km radius around the centroid of the primary sampling unit where the household is located. This indicator is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 63; a greater value indicates higher light intensity. Data are from version 4 DMSP-OLS nighttime lights time series, satellite F18 for both 2012 and 2013.
log(distance to bank)
Distance from the centroid of the primary sampling unit where the household is located to the nearest bank branch. Calculated based on the bank branch data collected by Beckmann et al. (2016) .
Variables Description internet
Binary variable, one if the respondent has access to the internet at home. own house, own other real estate Binary variables, one if the household owns its primary residence or other real estate.
trust in government, trust in EU
Based on question "I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. 1 means 'I trust completely', 2 means 'I somewhat trust', 3 means 'I neither trust nor distrust', 4 means 'I somewhat distrust' and 5 means 'I do not trust at all'. (a) the government (b) the European Union". Dummy variable coded as one if respondents somewhat or completely trust, zero else.
financial loss during previous crises
Binary variable based on question "If you think back in time to periods of economic turbulences that happened prior to 2008, e.g. very high inflation, banking crisis or restricted access to savings deposits. At that time, did you personally incur a financial loss due to such events?" Answers "No, I had no savings then" and "No, I did not incur a financial loss." coded as zero "Yes" coded as one.
Table 5: Saving instruments and trust in financial institutions
This table presents estimates obtained from probit models. Each specification represents a separate regression where we report the average marginal effects for trust variables only. We employ six dependent variables (cash only, formal savings, bank savings, contractual savings, capital market savings, >1 formal saving). All estimations include the full set of control variables reported in Table  4 as well as country-time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the primary sampling and survey wave appear in parentheses. P(DepVar) denotes the sample probability of the respective dependent variable. N denotes the number of observations. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. This table presents estimates obtained from probit models for the subsample of respondents who distrust banks. Each specification represents a separate regression. We employ six dependent variables (cash only, formal savings, bank savings, contractual savings, capital market savings, >1 formal saving). All estimations include the full set of control variables of Table 4 as well as country-time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the primary sampling and survey wave appear in parentheses. P(DepVar) denotes the sample probability of the respective dependent variable. N denotes the number of observations. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. This table presents estimates obtained from probit models. Each specification represents a separate regression. We employ four dependent variables which take the value one if the respondent names the respective saving instruments as the most important in terms of amounts saved: cash highest, bank savings highest, contractual savings highest, capital market savings highest. All estimations include the full set of control variables of Table 4 as well as country-time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the primary sampling and survey wave appear in parentheses. P(DepVar) denotes the sample probability of the respective dependent variable. N denotes the number of observations. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 4 as well as country-time-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the primary sampling and survey wave appear in parentheses. P(DepVar) denotes the sample probability of the respective dependent variable. N denotes the number of observations. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
